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THE HISTORY OF THE
PROBATE COURT*
EUGENE M. HAERTLE**
The Norman Conquest, 1066 A. D., produced a series of changes in
the government, judicial system, and social organization of England
which affected the development of the laws of wills, relating to real
estate, and the laws of testament, relating to personal property.
Before the Norman Conquest there had been no separate ecclesiasti-
cal courts in England. The clergy took part in the proceedings of the
secular courts. William the Conqueror separated the ecclesiastical
courts from the secular courts. In the field of probate the result was
that the ecclesiastical courts ultimately acquired jurisdiction of suc-
cession to personalty, including testamentary succession, while the
secular courts retained jurisdiction of succession to freehold interests
in realty, including jurisdiction over wills.
The Norman Conquest also hastened a set of changes in the or-
ganizataion of England, the result of which is known as feudalism.
The immediate effect of feudalism on landowning was the institution
of the doctrine of tenure. By that doctrine no subject in the kingdom
could own land absolutely. He could own.only an interest in land under
and subject to some other superior person. Every parcel of land in
England was held under some lord by some kind of service, and the
king, from whom theoretically all lands were originally derived, was
the lord paramount. When a tenant died without heirs, the land re-
turned or escheated to the lord. Thus, feudalism destroyed the power
of everyone but the king to will away the complete legal title to lands
in England.
By the Statute of Wills, 32 Henry VIII, Ch. 1 (1540), all persons,
except married minors, infants, idiots, and persons of unsound mind
were enabled to devise by will all land held by socage tenure and
two-thirds of the land held by knight service. Since the Statute of
Wills give power to devise all land held in socage, the effect of the
legislation of Charles II, 12 Charles II, Ch. 24 (1660), was to make
practically all lands devisable.
The Common Law took little interest in the goods of a person,
which were of far less public importance than land. The Church had
a definite interest in the goods of a deceased. The religious belief
of the time required that at least a part of his property be devoted
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to the good of his soul. If he made a will, it was almost certain that he
would make provisions for the saying of Masses. If he neglected to
make a will, and in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries it was re-
garded as almost a sin to die without making one, the Church would
make the provisions which he had failed to make for his soul. Thus,
the Church Courts assumed jurisdiction over dead men's goods. If
there was a will, the Bishop's Court was the proper place in which
it was to be proved and it was also the function of this court to see
that the executor carried out his duties properly. If there was no will,
the bishop would take charge of the goods that were left and would
make a suitable disposition of them. In 1285, the 'Ordinary,' i. e., the
ecclesiastical superior who had jurisdiction, was required by statute to
pay the debts of the intestate, just as the executor was required to pay
them. In 1357, he was required by statute to entrust the administra-
tion of the property to the near relations of the deceased. This statute
originated the office of administrator.
The Ecclesiastical Court was not the only court that dealt with
the goods of dead men since the executor or administrator often had
to sue in the Common Law Courts to recover the claims or property
of the deceased. The deceased's creditors could also sue the executor
in the Common Law Courts. Since neither the Ecclesiastical Courts
nor the Common Law Courts were well adapted to settle the numerous
conflicting rights of creditors, legatees, and next of kin, the most ef-
fectual and usual method of asserting a claim for or against the estate
of a deceased person was to get the estate administered in Chancery.
That court either told the executor or administrator what to do or took
the whole estate under its charge and distributed it. But this could
be done only after the will was proved or after letters of administra-
tion were granted by the Ecclesiastical Court. Without probate of the
will or letters of administration, neither executor nor administrator
could take any steps in any other court of law, for the executor's
proof of his title and the administrator's title itself could only be given
by the Ecclesiastical Court.
The jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts placed the develop-
ment of the laws of testament in the hands of men who knew more
about Canon Law and Roman Law than the Common Law and ac-
cordingly, the law of testament was borrowed in part from the Roman
Law.
Like the lay courts, the ecclesiastical courts were organized in a
graduated hierarchy; appeals lying from the lowest, through the
intermediate, courts and finally to the highest courts.
The lowest regular ecclesiastical courts were the courts of the arch-
deacons. Above these came the Dioceasan Courts of the bishops ("Con-
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sistory" Courts) and above these the provincial Courts of the two arch-
bishops. At the head of all was the Papal Curia at Rome.
In these courts the Mediaeval Church exercised a very wide juris-
diction.
1. It had jurisdiction, both civil and criminal, over the doings of
the clergy.
2. It had jurisdiction over the laity in matters affecting faith and
morality.
3. It had wide jurisdiction in matrimonial matters.
4. It originally had exclusive jurisdiction over wills of "personal"
property, over the granting of "probate" of such wills, and over the
administration of the personal property of intestates.
5. It had jurisdiction over matters affecting church property.
The mediaeval system of ecclesiastical courts was not much af-
fected by the Reformation, except that since the power of the State
had replaced the power of Rome, the ultimate right of appeal to the
Papal Curia naturally disappeared. In its place a Court of Delegates
was established in 1534, to hear appeals from the decisions of the
Provincial Courts. This new Court was composed of Royal Com-
missioners.
The law which was administered in the Ecclesiastical Courts was
the "Canon" (Church) Law, and many of its principles were de-
rived from the "Civil" (Roman) Law. Hence the lawyers who prac-
ticed it were not ordinary barristers, but "Civilians" (or Doctors").
In the 16th century these doctors acquired a special habitat of their
own, separate from the ordinary inns of courts, known as "Doctors
Common."
THE JUDGES
In the middle ages an ecclesiastical judge had to be in orders and
over twenty-five years of age. He was not necessarily a priest but might
have been in minor orders. He had a professional knowledge of Canon
Law gained through practice in some capacity in the ecclesiastical courts
and would also have a degree in Canon Law. He was appointed by a
commission either for a limited period or during the bishop's pleasure.
In the latter case, he could not enter into office under a new bishop
until such bishop had confirmed the appointment. In actual practice
a judge once appointed was generally continued in office by succeed-
ing bishops.
Every ecclesiastical judge could appoint a deputy, known as a
surrogate, to keep court for him in his absence. Under Canon 128, the
surrogate had to be a grave minister and a graduate, a licensed public
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preacher, or a Bachelor of Law (or a Master of Arts, at least), who
had some skill in the Civil and Canon Law.
REGISTRARS AND SCRIBES
Each court had its Registrar and Scribe to keep its acts. The
former was appointed by the judge of each ecclesiastical court. In the
seventeenth century registrars began to be appointed for life under
letters patent from the bishop. On appointment they took the same
oath and made the same declaration as prescribed for ecclesiastical
judges.
If the efficiency of the ecclesiastical courts depended on any one
man, that man was the registrar. He determined the time and order of
the hearing of cases, entered the acts of the court in the various regist-
ers, supervised the dispatch of citations, letters of suspension and
excommunication, and directly controlled the activity of the apparitors
(officers who executed the orders and decrees of the ecclesiastial
courts). He received the fees, examined witnesses, and conducted
inquisitions as ordered by the judge. A high standard of education
and training was required for the efficient conduct of his office. He
was of necessity a public notary. The registrars employed assistants
called scribes, who made the entries into the records.
At the present time in England there are four probate registrars,
assisted by a staff of clerks. In addition there are sixteen groups of
district registrars, with a chief registry and certain subject registrars
in each group. To qualify as a probate registrar, one must be a prac-
ticing barrister or solicitor of ten year standing, a district probate
registrar of five year standing, or a clerk with ten years service in the
principal probate registry.
PRACTICE OF THE COURTS
Probate Acts, containing the details of the process of proving testa-
ments and granting letters of administration, were entered in the
Ex Officio Act books. They usually contained the name of the de-
ceased, the names of the executors or administrators, the notice of
the grant of execution upon the exhibition of the inventory, the value of
the goods, and the fee charged. The books also contained various
claims upon goods of the deceased, letters to the court requesting
payments of debts or wages, and many other miscellaneous papers.
The goods of intestates were collected by the apparitors, and
proclamation was made three times to allow persons to claim any
debts owing to them by the deceased.
Regular fees were charged for probate, but no fees were charged
if the total value of the goods was less than 30s. Is. was charged for
totals ranging from 30s. to 100s.; 3s. for totals between 100s. and £20;
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5s. for totals between £20 and £40; 10s. for totals between £40 and
£100; 20s. for totals between £100 and k150, and thence an addi-
tional 10s. for every increase of £50.
In the course of time, as the power of the State grew and the
power of the Church in England diminished, the Ecclesiastical Courts
lost much of their ancient jurisdiction. In the early years of the nine-
teenth century, the Ecclesiastical Court nevertheless retained jurisdic-
tion over the conduct and discipline of the clergy in respect to church
matters, over matters affecting churches and consecrated ground, over
the probate of wills (though their early jurisdiction which had ex-
tended to the interpretation of wills and to the administration of estates
had passed to the Court of Chancery), and over certain matrimonial
matters. If a party to a proceeding in the ecclesiastical court thought
that the court had exceeded its jurdistion, he might obtain a writ of
prohibition in the common-law courts. While the writs of prohibition
crippled the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts, the common-law
courts from which they issued had no machinery adaptable to the
administration of estates. The net result was that chancery, with its
more flexible procedure, tended more and more to take over matters
of administration. Though the will would be admitted to probate and
the personal representative appointed by the ecclesiastical court, a
creditor or distributee might file his bill to have the estate administered
in chancery. This jurisdiction might be sought for the purpose of dis-
covering assets, because a trust was involved, or, though no actual
trust was involved, because the estate was regarded as a kind of trust
fund and the personal representative as a kind of trustee. But, for
whatever reason jurisdiction was assumed, chancery ordinarily con-
tinued with the administration until it was completed. Notices to
creditors were published, actions by creditors in common-law courts
were enjoined, and assets were brought in and distributed to creditors
and legatees or next of kin.
Not only did chancery administer personalty of the decedent, but it
also took charge of some or all of his real estate. Thus, if a testator
had devised his lands to his executor in trust for the payment of debts,
or for the payment of debts and legacies, the court of equity would
take charge of the land and administer it as directed by the testator.
Chancery never assumed jurisdiction to probate a will or to appoint
an executor or administrator. But, as to all subsequent steps in the
process of administration, it would take jurisdiction if an interested
party filed a bill asking for it. The concurrent jurisdiction of the
ecclesiastical courts continued, it is true, but the chancery procedure
was regarded as so much more satisfactory that administration in
equity became a common practice.
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In 1832, the Court of Delegates was abolished, and its powers
were transferred to the Judicial Committee. In 1857, the probate and
matrimonial jurisdiction of Ecclesiastical Courts was conferred upon
the Court of Probate and the Divorce Court. "Doctors Common"
ceased to exist. In 1925, a high court of justice was created, consisting
of three divisions, the Chancery Division, the Kings Bench Divisions,
and the Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Division. "The lumping to-
gether of these three topics is often a source of wonder or amusement.
Sir Alan Herbert has suggested that the idea is jurisdiction over wrecks
- wrecks of wills, marriages and ships," but it is to be noted that
"these three topics represent the main parts of the English law that
was of non-native growth."1 Today, in England, the powers of the
Ecclesiastical Courts are for the most part confined to a corrective
jurisdiction over the clergy and in this sense they are now really
"domestic tribunals."
The English colonists who settled the Atlantic coast in the seven-
teenth century brought with them the common law of England as modi-
fied by the Statute of Wills. However, the feudal system was never a
part of our law. The power of a testator to dispose of his realty as well
as his personalty by last will and testament has always been recog-
nized in the United States, but, nevertheless, it is upon English law
that the law of wills in the United States is based.
In very early colonial times, testamentary jurisdiction was com-
monly given to the general courts or vested in the governors and their
councils. Somewhat later, probate jurisdiction was added to the county
or other trial courts. Orphans courts were created in several states to in-
clude jurisdiction over executors and administrators, as well as over
guardians. Separate probate courts were established in other states and
have in the main persisted. jurisdiction over the persons and estates of
minors was given to the probate courts. Guardianship, curatorship,
conservatorship, adoption, proceedings, change of name, solemnization
of marriages, the administration of state inheritance or transfer taxes,
supervision of testamentary trusts, and, more recently, inter vivos
trusts were also added to the jurisdiction of the probate courts.
From approximately the middle of the 17th century until past the
middle of the 18th century, the region later known as the Northwest
Territory was a theater of exploration and occupancy by England and
France. The government was wholly military and private controversies
were summarily adjusted by the commandants. No written or statutory
law seemed to have been enacted for this region either by the older
French provinces of lower Canada or by England.
All French claims to the soil and jurisdiction were extinguished by
1 JACKSON, R.M., THE MACHINERY OF JUSTICE IN ENGLAND 46 (2d ed. 1953).
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the capture of Quebec and the surrender of all other French military
posts in America in 1760. The Treaty of Paris in 1763 cleared up the
title of England to all territories of the Mississippi. Government by
English commandants was substituted for that of French commandants.
The first legislation affecting the region was an act of the English
Parliament in 1774.
By the Treaty of 1783, terminating the Revolutionary War, Eng-
land in turn relinquished to the American Congress all the territory
east of the Mississippi and south of the Great Lakes which she had
wrested from France 20 years earlier. Congress than enacted the
Ordinance of 1787, setting up the Northwest Territory.
The Ordinance of 1787, in the second of its "Articles of Compact,"
provided that the inhabitants "shall always be entitled to . . . judicial
proceedings, according to the course of the common law." A court of
probate and a surrogate court were established in 1793, and in 1795,
a recording act for deeds, wills, and other important instruments was
passed. In 1818, "An act for establishing courts of probate," adopted
bodily from Massachusetts, and three several acts adopted also from
Massachusetts provided every county in the territory with a probate
court and a full code of probate law. This code, planted initially in
Wisconsin in Brown and Crawford counties, soon extended to Iowa
and Milwaukee counties, and, when Wisconsin became a territory, to
the other counties from time to time as they were organized. The
laws originating in Massachusetts thus became and still constitute the
basis of jurisdiction and procedure in the county courts of Wisconsin.
No other court of civil or criminal jurisdiction was established
west of Lake Michigan until an act, taking effect April 1, 1821, pro-
vided each county with a court called the county court, presided over
by not less than two of the territorial judges, who were required to hold
one term each year.
The case of Estate of George2 gives the following historical develop-
ment of the courts of probate:
It appears that in 1839 there was established in the territory
of Wisconsin courts of probate by act of the legislative assembly
for the territory. The territorial court had jurisdiction to pro-
bate wills, grant letters of administration, appoint guardian,
examine and allow accounts of executors, administrators, and
guardians 'and shall have cognizance of all such other matters
and things as the laws of this territory do or may direct.' See
Territorial Stats. 1839, p. 296. See also Laws of Territory of
Michigan 1833, p. 297.
Sec. 2 art. VII, Wis. Const., provides:
"The judicial power of this state, both as to matters
of law and equity, shall be vested in a supreme court,
2 225 Wis. 251, 259-62, 274 N.W. 294, 295-6 (1937).
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circuit courts, courts of probate, and in justices of the
peace ....
Sec. 14, Art. VII, after providing for the election of ajudge of probate, provides:
. . Provided, however, that the legislature shall have
power to abolish the office of judge of probate in any
county, and to confer probate powers upon such inferior
courts as may be established in said county."
The first legislature enacted ch. 85, R. S. 1948, establishing
courts of probate. The powers of this court were defined in secs.
5 to 8 of that act. The powers conferred were substantially those
conferred upon the territorial court.
By sec. 2, ch. 86 R. S. 1849, an inferior court to be known
as the county court was created. The county court so created
was vested with civil jurisdiction. By secs. 3 and 4 of ch. 86 the
duties of a judge of probate were transferred to the county
courts as of January 1, 1850. By that act it was provided:
"Sec. 3. Such court (the county court) shall have the
powers and jurisdiction not by law conferred on judges
of probate, and shall perform all of the duties of judges
of probate, in the manner provided by law, etc.
[Sec. 4 provided:]
. . . and the said judges of the county court, from and
after that day, shall be invested with full and exclusive
probate powers.
Thus, it appears that the county court at the time of its
origin had two kinds of jurisdiction: Jurisdiction in civil matters
and in probate matters. In considering the early cases this dis-
tinction must be borne in mind. Norval v. Rice (1853), 2 Wis.
17; Supervisors of Crawford County v. Le Clere (1851), 3 Pin.
325; Brunson v. Burnett (1849), 2 Pin. 185.
In the revision of 1858, the provisions of ch. 85, R. S. 1849,
appear as the first part of ch. 117, under the title 'Of county
courts.' Ch. 86, R. S. 1849, became the last part of ch. 117
under the subtitle 'Of county courts having civil jurisdiction.'
However, the county courts with civil jurisdiction were con-
fined to the counties of Milwaukee, LaCrosse, St. Croix,
Douglas, and La Pointe. In the revision of 1878, the statutory
provisions relating to the probate powers of the county court
were set out in ch. 114, entitled 'Of county courts.' Ch. 115,
entitled 'Of other courts of record,' related to the civil jurisdic-
tion of some of the county courts. This legislative treatment
of the county court as a court of probate (ch. 114) and as an
inferior court (ch. 115) reappeared in the Wisconsin statutes
for 1889 and in the original revision of 1898. . . . ch. 114 of
the statutes of 1898 is now ch. 253 of the Wisconsin statutes for
1935. Ch. 115, R. S. 1898, now appears as part of the 'Table of
all special private and local laws,' etc., in the 1930 Annotations
and the appendices under the title 'County Courts.'
Although the probate courts derive historically from the
ecclesiastical courts of England, their jurisdiction is different
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and wider, our county courts having jurisdiction in matters in
probate formerly exercised by courts of chancery and common
law.
With respect to matters in probate equity. State ex rel. Peterson
v. Circuit Court [(1922), 177 Wis. 548, 188 N. W. 645] ; Shupe
v. Jenkes (1928, 195 Wis. 334, 218 N. W. 375; Wisdom v.
Wisdom (1914), 155 Wis. 434, 145 N. W. 126; Meyer v.
Garthwaite (1896), 92 Wis. 571, 577, 66 N. W. 704.
Under court reorganization the probate jurisdiction is retained in
the county courts of the state. If there is more than one branch of
the county court in a county, the probate jurisdiction is centered in
Branch 1, except in Milwaukee County where it is centered in Branches
1 and 2. The judges sitting in these branches exercise the constitutional
probate powers of the probate courts.3 Under the act 4 the registers
in probate remain the right hand of the judges of the probate branches
of the county courts.5
3 WIs. CONST. art VII, §§2 and 14; WIS. STAT. §§253.18(1) and (2) (1959).
4 WIs. STAT. §§253.31, 253.32, and 253.33 (1959).
5 The above article was prepared from the following additional sources:
A. THE ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS-PRINCIPLES oF REcONSTRUcTION (The Report
of the Commission on Ecclesiastical Courts set up by the Archbishops of
Canterbury and York in 1951, at the request of the Convocations) (1954).
B. GELDART, W., ELEMENTS OF ENGLISH LAW (Revised by Sir William Holds-
worth and H. G. Hanbury) (6th ed. 1959).
C. JAMES, P. S., INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LAW (1959)
D. 1 PAGE ON WILLS, ch. 2 (Lifetime ed. 1941).
E. SIMES AND BAYSE, PROBLEMS IN PRoBATE LAW (Including a Model Pro-
bate Code) (1946).
F. 1941 WISCONSIN ANNOTATIONS, Common and Statute Law in the North-
west Territories, 1820-30.
G. WOODCOCK, B., THE MEDIEVAL ECCESIASTICAL COURTS IN THE DIOCESE OF
CANTERBURY (1952).
[Vol. 45
